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 Mariska Leunissen
Introduction: fixed forms, flexible natures
 For Aristotle, living beings are complex composites of matter and form, 
where form is to be understood functionally, and not merely as shape, as a 
specific combination of soul-capacities that characterizes the kind of living being 
in question. It is a commonplace in Aristotelian scholarship that both these 
forms of living beings and the enmattered animal species to which they give 
rise are “fixed”. Forms are “fixed” in the sense that they—without being eternal 
themselves—are replicated eternally through sexual reproduction from father to 
offspring: the offspring receives a “potential for form” that is formally (but not 
numerically) identical to the form its father possesses in actuality.1 Since this potential 
for form is for the most part—that is, if nothing greater impedes—realized in the 
same way, and since the cosmos is eternal in time, Aristotle believes that there 
is a continuous generation—and corruption—of organisms that are one in form 
and that instantiate the same range of animal species.2 Within these confines, 
there is no room for a transformation of species.
 In seeming contradiction with this fixity of species, however, Aristotle’s 
biological works often stress the flexibility of nature during embryogenesis and 
the later development of animals. Aristotle typically describes the process of the 
actualization of a potential for form into an actual animal in terms of “formal 
natures” “making” or “producing” the animal. This formal nature instantiates 
the animal’s efficient, formal, and final cause (which is identical to its soul), 
and following the craft-model already employed by Plato, Aristotle personifies 
this internal principle as acting for the sake of something, while following a 
certain logos or “guideline” for building (see, e.g., PA I 1, 641a23-28; DA II 1, 
412a19-21 and GA IV 4, 770b17).3 Given the unchangeability of animal species, 
one would expect these “guidelines”, or “definitions of the animal’s substantial 
being,” to be rather strict and precise, but instead Aristotle suggests that they are 
underdetermined. Instead of this being specified by the animal’s logos, Aristotle 
claims that it is somehow “up to” formal natures to determine which parts to 
produce for the performance of a certain function, how many of those parts they 
should make, and where in the animal body they should place them. Evidently, 
even though the starting points (i.e., the potentials for form) and end points (i.e., 
the fully developed animals of a given species) of animal generation are “fixed” and 
“permanent” features of the world, the individual actions of the formal natures 
through which this process is carried out are not similarly pre-determined.
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 My purposes in this paper are, first, to delineate the range of flexibility 
Aristotle believes natures actually have in their design of animals, and second, to 
draw out some of the implications this has for our understanding of Aristotle’s 
account of embryology and his theory of natural teleology. I will argue that 
Aristotle’s tendency to think of the activities of formal natures in the production 
of animals as if performed by tinkering craftsmen shows that for him, the structure 
and functionality animals have is as much a result of the teleology embedded in 
their forms as it is of the goal-directed actions performed by their formal nature 
in realizing those forms. This indicates that at least at the level of embryogenesis, 
Aristotle does allow for something like a transformation of species4 and that 
his view of development is epigenetic in the true sense of the term. That is, the 
“guidelines” for building with which nature works do not predetermine in advance 
all the changes that need to be made, but rather leave room for nature to make 
adjustments to animal design “on the fly,” as the development proceeds. For his 
theory of natural teleology this means that the underlying physiology must be 
rather complex and flexible: the potentials for form that guide the realization of 
those species are dynamic, rather than blind, automated self-regulating principles, 
as they are shown to be capable of responding to “unexpected” changes in 
circumstances.5
1. The problem of animal design in Aristotle’s biology
 In his famous exhortation to the study of philosophy in the Parts of Animals, 
Aristotle argues that we should not look down on the study of animals that are not 
pleasing to perception, because “the nature that crafted them (ἡ δημιουργήσασα 
φύσις) likewise provides extraordinary pleasures to those who are able to know 
their causes and are by nature philosophers (PA I 5, 645a7-10).” He continues 
by saying that it would be unreasonable and absurd that, “if we enjoy studying 
likenesses of animals on the ground that we are at the same time studying the 
art that crafted them, such as painting or sculpture, we would not be even more 
fond of the study of things constituted by nature, at least when we can observe 
their causes (645a11-15).” Aristotle’s point here is that it helps to think of animals 
as being no less the result of a kind of craftsmanship as are their likenesses in 
paint or stone, and that therefore the study of their causes should provide similar 
pleasures to those who are philosophically minded.
 This depiction of nature as a craftsman is, as I indicated in the introduction, 
common in Aristotle’s biological works, and it often merely serves the purpose of 
elucidating obscure organic processes, such as embryogenesis in the Generation of 
Animals. For Aristotle, the processes of artificial production and natural generation 
are similar in that they both involve replications of form in matter through the 
operation of an efficient cause, and both take place for the sake of creating an 
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organized, functioning whole.6 Also, in both processes, the efficient cause starts 
out as operating from the outside, but in natural generation it ultimately becomes 
internal to the generative process as the animal’s soul. Thus, when explaining 
why embryogenesis and birth must take place in the female, Aristotle likens the 
male semen to a carpenter and a potter, who must keep in close contact to their 
respective materials, and to an architect, who is “in the building it makes” (GA I 
22, 730a32-b8). In those male animals that do not emit semen, “nature resembles 
those who model clay rather than carpenters”, because it does not shape the 
material with tools, but with its own hands (730b8-32; cf. PA II 9, 654b27-32). 
Once the heart is present, the remaining formation of the embryo takes place 
through the actions of the soul, which makes use of heat and cold as its tools 
(GA II 1, 734b20-735a29; II 4, 740b25-741a4; and II 6, 743a36-b5) and proceeds 
in a manner resembling painters (GA II 6, 743b18-25):
The upper half of the body, then, is first marked out in the order of 
development; as time goes on the lower also reaches its full size in the 
blooded animals. All the parts are first marked out in their outlines 
and acquire later on their color and softness or hardness, exactly as if 
nature were a painter producing a work of art (ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἂν 
ὑπὸ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργούμενα), for painters, too, 
first sketch in (ὑπογράψαντες) the animal with lines and only after 
that put in the colors.7
These comparisons help to visualize the process of reproduction, and are 
compatible with a non-intentional model of teleology. At least within the context 
of the Generation of Animals, we never see these natural efficient causes waver 
or deliberate about how best to produce an animal or its parts. Just as expert 
craftsmen, formal natures automatically “know” what to do and in what order 
to perform each of their actions (cf. GA I 23, 731a25 and the analogy of nature 
to a good housekeeper in II 6, 744b11-27).8
 However, not all of Aristotle’s depictions of natures as craftsmen are as 
innocent as these. Especially in the Parts of Animals, Aristotle drops the comparisons 
and turns nature itself into a craftsman who makes choices, takes away or adds 
parts, and wishes to do things. It is here that we find the animal design to be in 
part “up to” nature, rather than being completely determined by the animal’s 
substantial being. The purpose of this imagery, I submit, is no longer didactic, 
but explanatory: when trying to explain why certain parts or their differentiations 
belong to the kinds of animals they do, thinking about formal natures as tinkering 
craftsmen—often embedded in the form of teleological principles such as “nature 
does nothing in vain”—becomes an important heuristic strategy for Aristotle for the 
discovery of causes. Where other methods fail to reveal the cause of the presence, 
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absence, or differentiation of a part, Aristotle appeals to a hypothetical moment 
in time at which a nature first designed the animal (in a manner resembling the 
“first creation” of human beings in Plato’s Timaeus).9 By comparing the features 
an animal “should” have had, given its substantial being, to the features the 
animal in fact can be observed to have, Aristotle discovers a design problem and 
then explains the animal’s actual features as nature’s teleological solution to 
that problem. The images of crafting natures as used in the Parts of Animals are 
thus remnants of thought experiments (that combine forms of reasoning very 
similar to adaptive thinking and reverse engineering) Aristotle engaged in while 
attempting to find explanations of anomalies in animals, but they also add a level 
of complexity and flexibility to his theory of natural teleology: not everything that 
is good in the world of natural phenomena derives from an in itself not further 
explicable, predetermined good embedded in forms.
 In the remainder, I provide support for these claims by discussing three 
kinds of cases in which Aristotle describes formal natures as deviating from the 
“original design” or the “instructions” in the animal’s form, consisting in (1) the 
removal of parts; (2) the re-use of already existing parts for a second function; 
and (3) the production of “luxury” features (such as hairs, horns, and eyebrows) 
from materially necessitated residues. Using these cases as a starting point, I will 
then, in sections 2 and 3, lay out the parameters for the actions of formal natures, 
first the ones that are qualified as being “necessary” for it, and then the actions 
that are qualified as “best” or as “for the better”.10
Case 1: removing parts
 The clearest case in which Aristotle claims formal natures deviate from the 
original animal design pertains to “paradoxical” absences of parts. The absence 
of a part is paradoxical when one has reason to expect that part to be present 
in the animal in question on the grounds that it can be observed to be present 
in either all the members of the animal’s wider kind, or in many or all closely 
related animals (for instance, fish—which are swimmers by definition—all have 
fins, but serpentine fish do not; monkeys have tails, but humans—who are in 
many respects similar to these blooded land-dwellers—do not). Only if the part 
belongs (or reasonably could be expected to belong) to the animal’s original 
design, Aristotle tries to explain its absence, and he does so by appealing to 
the teleological principle that “nature does nothing in vain, but always from 
among the possibilities does what is best for each being”.11 The principle is an 
empirical hypothesis about the goal-directed actions of formal natures in the 
generation of animals: seeing that for the most part animals are not equipped 
with useless or non-functioning parts, we may infer that this applies to all the 
works of nature and posit that nature never produces anything in vain (see IA 
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2, 704b12-15).12 Such a general rule of nature then helps to generate a thought 
experiment: imagine the missing part to be present, and “see” if you can detect 
some other feature of the animal that would interfere with its functionality or 
that would make its presence redundant. If there is no such interfering part, the 
now missing part must be absent for non-teleological reasons: it must be due to 
a lack of constitutive materials in that animal, which is a material constraint.13 
If there is such an interfering part, however, it must be the cause for why the 
now missing part is in fact absent: the animal’s formal nature “decided” not to 
produce (or even: to take away) that part on the grounds that its presence would 
have been in vain in this particular kind of animal.
 Let me quote one of my favorite examples (IA 8, 708a9-20):
In snakes the cause of why they are footless is, both, that nature does 
nothing in vain, but always from among the possibilities, [does] what is 
best for each thing, preserving the proper substantial being of each and 
its essence; and, in addition, that which we stated before, namely that 
no blooded animal can move itself at more than four points. For from 
these [two principles] it is evident that of the blooded animals whose 
length is out of proportion to the rest of the nature of their body, like 
snakes, none of them possibly can have limbs. For they cannot have 
more than four feet (since in that case they would be bloodless), and if 
they had two feet or four they would be almost completely immobile: so slow 
and useless would their movement necessarily be.
 Observation shows that all blooded animals that live on land have four feet: 
they share to a certain extent the same form, and their design can therefore be 
expected to share certain co-extensive features like the possession of a maximum 
of four feet. The snake, however, possesses all the typical properties that belong to 
blooded land-dwellers, except for feet. Aristotle explains this absence by pointing 
out that the presence of four feet in snakes would have been in vain, on account 
of the snake’s disproportionate dimensions (and giving more than four feet is 
impossible, as this would violate the substantial being of blooded animals). A 
quick thought experiment reveals that no blooded animal whose length is out 
of proportion to the rest of their body would be able to move swiftly with either 
two or four feet, and in order to remedy that design problem, nature “decided” 
not to produce feet in such animals. With this information, it would then be 
possible to formulate a scientific explanation that does not appeal to any conscious 
intentionality in nature.15
 In a few cases, Aristotle even suggests that formal natures actively “take away” 
features in the production of animals, again because their presence would be 
in vain. This is, for instance, how Aristotle explains the absence of sideways jaw 
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motions in fish, birds, and egg-laying four-footed animals (PA IV 11, 691a27-b4):
Since the head is divided in two, the upper part and the lower, mankind 
and the live-bearing, four-footed animals move their jaws up, down, and 
sideways, while fish, birds, and egg-laying four-footed animals only move 
them up and down. That is because up-and-down movement is useful 
for biting and cutting, while sideways movement is useful for grinding. 
Therefore for those that have grinding teeth, sideways motion is useful, 
but for those that do not, it is not useful at all, which is why it is taken 
away (ἀφῄρηται) from all such animals; for nature produces nothing 
superfluous.
Apparently, the “proto-typical” way in which jaws are produced in animals (for the 
sake of aiding nutrition) allows them to move up and down as well as sideways. 
However, in those that lack grinding teeth, the sideways motion would be in 
vain (just imagine its presence!), which is why nature takes it away (cf. PA IV 10, 
689b21-5; Cael II 8, 290a29-35; HA II 17, 508a8-11; and Pl. Ti 33d-34a).
 In both examples, the absence of a part is explained as an improvement of 
the design implied by the animal’s form: blindly following the instructions in 
the definition of the substantial being would lead to animals with improperly 
functioning or vain parts, but fortunately, “nature does nothing in vain”.
Case 2: reusing parts
 A second case in which Aristotle claims formal natures make adjustments 
to the original animal design involves the “reuse” of an already existing part for 
a second function. Typically, natures produce one (set of) part(s) for the sake of 
realizing each of the functions that are specified by the definition of the substantial 
being (I return to this “rule” below in section 3), and each function has its own 
proper realizing part. For instance, if the animal is to be a flyer, it receives wings 
(and not some other part), because wings are the necessary prerequisites for the 
realization of the function of flying, and so natures produce wings in all birds (PA 
IV 12, 693b6-14), even if not all birds ever engage in flight (693b28-694a9). In a 
few cases, however, Aristotle believes that the function specified by the animal’s 
form cannot be realized in the usual way: its proper part cannot be produced 
at all or cannot be produced in a way that makes it suitable for the function in 
question, and natures will have to improvise and make use of some other part 
that is already available in the animal to make the performance of that function 
possible. Aristotle emphasizes that the parts that are being “reused” by nature 
did not come to be for the sake of that second function: instead, they came to 
be for the sake of performing some other function (which is their primary and 
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proper function), but since they are present and possess the right kind of material 
potentials, nature can easily adopt or modify them for the sake of allowing them 
to perform a second function. Aristotle describes the actions of nature in these 
cases as making use of a part for another use, where the verb for using bears 
connotations of misuse or additional use (cf. Cael. I 3, 270b24).16
 A nice example of such a reused part is the elephant’s trunk.17 In a long 
passage (PA II 16, 658b32-659a36), Aristotle first explains why elephants have 
the specific nose they have. Elephants have a nose in virtue of being a breather 
of air (that is, noses are a necessary prerequisite for the performance of the 
necessary function of cooling), but they have the specific, long nose they have 
because they need an organ for breathing air while being in the water looking 
for nourishment: long noses function for elephants like snorkels do for human 
divers (659a6-12). However, in order for trunks to be so long, they have to be—of 
conditional necessity—soft and flexible, and Aristotle goes on to explain how 
nature makes use of these material potentials of the trunk in order to make up 
for the uselessness of their feet for grasping food (659a20-30; 34-6):
Since [the trunk] is such [i.e., soft and flexible], nature, as it is used 
to, uses the same parts for several things (ἡ φύσις παρακαταχρῆται, 
καθάπερ εἴωθεν, ἐπὶ πλείονα τοῖς αὐτοῖς μορίοις), [here using] it 
in place of the use of front feet. For four-footed animals with many toes 
have front feet in place of hands, not merely for the sake of supporting 
their weight. And the elephants are members of this group; that is, they 
have feet that are neither cloven- nor solid-hoofed. But since the size 
and weight of their body are great, their feet are only for the sake of 
support, and because of their slowness and their natural unsuitability 
for bending, they are useless for anything else... And the use of its feet 
having been taken away, nature, as we said, also makes use of this part 
for the service that would have been provided by the feet.
Typically, four-footed animals with many toes have feet that are capable of 
providing both support for their bodies and means to transport food to their 
mouths: the form “many-toed four-footer” is “normally” realized by giving these 
animals four supporting, but bendable feet. However, in elephants, this use of 
feet is taken away, and so their natures have to deviate from the original design 
by assigning a second function to the elephant’s trunk, but without having to 
change any of its features. Although physically, the design of the elephant has 
not changed, natures had to move the function of grasping food to the trunk, a 
function which was “supposed to be” performed by its feet.
 In cases like this, nature still realizes all the functions specified by the definition 
of the substantial being of the animal, but, because of the design-problems that 
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only become clear during the animal’s production process, it has to do so in an 
“unexpected” way.18
Case 3: adding “bonus features”
 A third case in which formal natures adjust an animal’s original design involves 
the use of extra materials for which there are, so to speak, no instructions in 
the definition of the substantial being of the animal. The teleological processes 
involved in the realization of the animal’s potential for form sometimes 
produce—accidentally and of material necessity—flows of residues or even entire 
structures. And even though these materials or structures are thus not themselves 
an immediate product of the operation of teleology (their coming to be is not 
conditionally necessitated for the sake of realizing functions specified by the 
animal’s form), formal natures can use them “for the better” by turning them 
into parts that increase the well-being of the animal, instead of just discarding 
them from the body. Once co-opted by the formal natures, these parts become 
beneficial “bonus features” added to the animal’s original design: hypothetically 
speaking, the animal could have done without them, but with their presence, it 
is better off.19
 Eyebrows and eyelashes are such “added” features (PA II 15, 658b14-25):
The eyebrows and eyelashes are both for protection… The eyelids are at 
the ends of small blood vessels; for where the skin terminates, the small 
blood vessels also reach their limit. So because the moist secretions oozing 
are bodily, it is necessary that—unless some function of nature stops it 
with a view to another use (ἂν μή τι τῆς φύσεως ἔργον ἐμποδίσῃ 
πρὸς ἄλλην χρῆσιν)—even owing to a cause such as this, hair from 
necessity comes to be in these locations.
As Aristotle indicates, the structures that form eyebrows and eyelashes come to be 
of material necessity—a process that is not initiated by a formal nature, but also not 
stopped by it. Nature allows the growth of eyebrows and eyelashes, because once 
present, these structures—because of their hard and earthen nature and because 
of the location where they of necessity appear—serve the function of protection.
In other cases, nature does stop the flow of material, but only to redirect it to 
other parts in the body, where it uses it for the production of beneficial parts 
(PA III 2 663b22-35):
But we must say what the character of the necessary nature is, and, 
how nature according to the account makes use of things present of 
necessity for the sake of something… For the residual surplus of this sort 
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of [earthen] body, being present in the larger of the animals, is used by 
nature for protection and advantage (ἐπὶ βοήθειαν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον 
καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις), and the surplus, which flows of necessity to the 
upper region, in some cases it distributes (ἀπένειμε) to teeth and tusks, 
in other cases to horns.
Both the careful teleological language in these examples (“for” instead of the 
more technical “for the sake of”) and the reference to material necessity in the 
coming to be of these features are typical characteristics of the “bonus features” in 
Aristotle’s biology. They are never the necessary prerequisites for the performance 
of necessary functions as specified by the definition of the substantial being of 
the animal. Instead, they assist other parts in performing their functions, such 
as kidneys helping the bladder to collect residue (PA III 7, 670b23-7), or perform 
functions that appear to be non-necessary for the animal to reproduce or survive, 
such as horns providing protection to the male deer that have them (PA III 1, 
661b28-662a2). Their functions are therefore subsidiary or luxury, and the parts 
themselves are often simply referred to as being “for the better”.
 The availability of materially necessitated residues or structures in these cases 
thus provide “extra” possibilities for natures to produce features that increase 
the animal’s well being and thereby improve them, even though none of these 
features were part of the original design.
 In sum, the development of an animal consists for Aristotle in the actualization 
of an internal, pre-existing potential for form, transmitted by the father into the 
female menses and brought to completion through the animal’s formal nature. 
It is this potential for form that encodes the animal’s development, and that 
guides—but not completely predetermines—the actions of the formal nature during 
the different stages of animal development. The picture of the actions of formal 
natures that arises from the three cases discussed above is that formal natures 
always act in accordance with the specifications in the definition of the substantial 
being of the animal they are producing, unless during the production process this 
turns out not to be beneficial or possible, and that they improve the design of an 
animal if this is possible due to the availability of extra materials. In the sections 
below, I further specify the parameters for the actions of the formal nature within 
which these “epigenetic” adjustments take place.
2. Constraints on formal natures: doing the necessary
 When Aristotle qualifies an action as being necessary for a formal nature to 
perform, that typically means that the action is necessary given the substantial 
being of the animal that is being brought into being. Without the realization 
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of the functions and other features that are specified in the definition of the 
substantial being of the animal, the animal in question cannot exist or be the 
kind of animal it is. Formal natures therefore have to produce the necessary 
prerequisites for animals to survive and to have the identity they have (cf. PA I 
1, 640a33-35); it is part of the teleology of nature that formal natures never fall 
short in producing those necessities (see DA III 9, 432b21-6).
 Unfortunately, Aristotle is not very explicit about what kinds and how 
many of those functions and features exactly are included in the definition of 
an animal’s substantial being. At a minimum, as has already been suggested by 
Gotthelf and Code,20 these specifications include (1) the vital and essential soul 
functions as specified by the relevant differentiae21 of the animal, and sometimes 
specific organic parts themselves;22 (2) the sizes and dimensions of animals;23 
and (3) the bloodedness or bloodlessness of an animal.24 It is plausible that the 
definition also specifies (4) the ratio of the elemental blend constitutive of the 
animal’s material nature. Below, I discuss the implications these four kinds of 
specifications have for the actions of the formal natures, indicating both what 
actions are necessary for them to perform and (less so) what actions are impossible. 
Together, these constraints on the actions of the formal natures exhibit the level 
of predeterminism in Aristotle’s embryology and the extent to which teleology 
is already embedded in the forms of animals.
 The first category of features listed in the definition of the substantial being 
of the animal, that is, the vital and essential functions to be performed by the 
animal in question, provides stringent guidelines for what parts formal natures 
must make. In order to realize the animal’s form, formal natures must produce 
(a) those parts that are explicitly mentioned in the definition of the substantial 
being as well as (b) the parts that are the necessary prerequisites for the realization 
of the vital and essential functions as specified by the relevant differentiae in 
that definition. For instance, the definition of human beings will include “is 
lunged” and “is able to see”, which means that they must have lungs and eyes, the 
proper parts for the realization of vision (GA V 1, 778a29-b19). Natures cannot 
produce humans without either of these parts, because in that case humans 
would immediately fail to reach their natural ends (cf. GA IV 4, 771a11-14).
In order for us to reconstruct whether a part is such a necessary prerequisite, 
Aristotle suggests we look at its distribution among animals that all perform 
the function associated with that part: observation shows that there may well 
be several parts associated with the performance of the same function, but only 
the part that is present in all animals that perform it is necessary; the other parts 
must be subsidiary. For instance, ducts for semen and testes both play a role in 
male sexual reproduction, but whereas ducts for semen are present in all males 
that reproduce sexually, testes are not (GA I 4, 717a11-31):
11
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Now if nature does everything either because it is necessary, or because 
it is better (εἰ δὴ πᾶν ἡ φύσις ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ 
βέλτιον), this part [i.e., testes], too, must be because of one or the other. 
That it is not necessary for generation is evident: for it would be present 
in all that generate, but as it is neither the snake nor the fish have testes 
(for they have been seen coupling and with the channels full of semen). 
It remains then that they are for the better in some way… Those who 
need to be more temperate have in the one case [of nutriment] intestines 
that are not straight, and in the other case [of sexual reproduction] their 
ducts twisted to prevent their desire being too violent and hasty. The 
testes are built (μεμηχανημένοι) for this; for they make the movement 
of the spermatic secretion steadier ...
By postulating that the actions of formal natures are either necessary or for the 
better, Aristotle is able to reconstruct the status of a part as either a necessary 
prerequisite for the performance of a necessary function (here: ducts are the 
necessary prerequisites for male sexual reproduction), or as a subsidiary part that 
helps the performance of that function in a subgroup of animals (here: testes are 
for slowing down reproduction in males that are too passionate).
 This requirement for nature to produce the necessary parts is only overruled 
in those rare cases where, as we saw above, the presence of the typical necessary 
part in a certain kind of animal would be in vain: in those cases, nature has to 
come up with an alternative solution to allow the animal to perform its vital and 
essential functions.
 The animal’s basic size and dimensions constitute the second category 
of features specified in the definition of its substantial being. Nature cannot 
tinker with them (although environmental factors may cause—relatively small—
differences of the more and the less: see HA VIII 28), even if changing the size 
or the dimensions would help to solve design problems. For instance, shorter 
snakes would have been able to walk well with four feet, and smaller (and hence 
lighter) elephants would not have needed such sturdy feet, thus enabling them 
to use their feet for grasping food. However, in both cases, Aristotle takes the 
animal’s size as a causally basic feature and as something that is not up to formal 
natures to change. Similarly, observation shows that one kind of octopus has one 
row of suckers, whereas another has two, but this differentiation has nothing to 
do with teleology (PA IV 9, 685b12-16):
Now while the other octopuses have two rows of suckers, one kind of 
octopus has a single row. This is because of the length and thinness of 
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their nature; for it is necessary that the narrow tentacle should have a 
single row of suckers. It is not, then, because it is best that they have 
this feature, but because it is necessary owing to the distinctive account 
of their substantial being (οὐκ οὖν ὡς βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ” ὡς 
ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον τῆς οὐσίας).
Aristotle suggests that, instead, the differentiation is a necessary consequence of 
the differences in size of the two kinds of octopus. Changing the size or the 
dimensions of an animal will destroy its functionality or turn it into an altogether 
different kind of being (cf. Pol V 3, 1302b33-1303a2; V 9, 1309b18-35; and VII 4, 
1326a35-b2), and is therefore not a possible action for formal natures to perform.
 The third category of features specified in the definition of the substantial 
being of animals is their having (red) blood or being bloodless (that is, having 
an analogue of blood). This is an important specification (and one of the most 
important differentia of animals: HA I 6, 490b7-32), because it does not only 
entail the necessity of nature producing blood or its analogue in the animal in 
question, but also the necessity of producing certain other sets of parts.
 For instance, since blood forms the matter and nourishment for the whole 
body (see, e.g., PA II 3, 650b6-7; II 6, 652a6-7; and III 5, 668a5-13), every blooded 
animal must have parts for the production of blood and for its distribution. This 
means, among others, that the formal natures of blooded animals have to produce 
a heart (PA II 1, 647a35-b8 and III 4, 665b10-15), blood vessels (PA III 5), and a 
liver (PA IV 2, 677a36-b5): “For it is reasonable that, since the nature of the liver 
is vital and necessary to all the blooded animals, its being of a certain character 
is a cause of living a shorter or longer time. … and none of the other viscera is 
necessary to these animals, but only the liver.” Together with the heart, which is 
the origin of blood, the presence of the liver is so basic to the life and survival 
of blooded animals that no blooded animal can live without it; the presence of 
the heart and the liver is required in all blooded animals (cf. PA III 4, 665a28-
30, 665b10, 666a24-25 and III 7, 670a23-8). The other visceral parts, such as 
the kidneys and the spleen, are not in the same way necessary for all blooded 
animals (see, e.g., PA III 7, 670b23-7: “the kidneys are present in those that have 
them not of necessity, but for the sake of the good and doing well), and are therefore 
not present in all blooded animals (cf. PA III 9, 671a26-30 and III 12, 673b12-
14). The bloodless animals, of course, have no viscera, but only an analogue of 
the heart (PA IV 5, 678a26-b3).
 Furthermore, the blooded- or bloodlessness of an animal also puts restrictions 
on the amount of appendages formal natures can attach to it. Aristotle believes 
that being blooded correlates universally with (and possibly causes: see IA 6, 
707a6-21) having a maximum of four points of motion, and hence of having a 
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maximum of four appendages or locomotive parts (HA I 5, 490a26-b1). Formal 
natures therefore cannot give more than four appendages to blooded animals, 
even if that would solve problems in their design (see again IA 8, 708a9-20, quoted 
above). For bloodless animals there is no such restriction: they can receive four or 
more appendages, as long as the total number remains even (IA 8, 708a21-b17; 
cf. PA IV 6, 682a35-b4).
 A final feature that is likely specified by the definition of an animal’s substantial 
being is the ratio—or, “recipe”—for its material make-up, which determines the 
proportion of the material elements that are to be used in the production and 
constitution of the animal in question (cf. PA I 1, 642a22: λόγον τῆς μίξεως).25 
Just as there is a specific ratio of the mixture for each of the body parts (DA I 4, 
408a13-18), there is a specific, generic ratio for each kind of animal (and perhaps 
even for each gender within that kind: cf. GA IV 2, 767a13-28). Birds, for instance, 
“are all constituted from the same material” (PA IV 12, 694b18), and since this 
is a “given,” formal natures will just have to make do with this material in their 
production of all the subspecies of birds (694b17-20). Similarly, in Aristotle’s 
discussion of the different modes of reproduction in GA II 1, 732a25-733b23, 
the differences in the elemental make-up of animals, in combination with the 
amount of internal heat they have, are treated as givens, which then cause the 
differences in perfection in the modes of reproduction (see especially 732b27-29).
 However, even though the recipe for an animal’s material nature is thus likely 
determined by its form, the resulting material nature itself can act independently of 
the form and may pose restrictions on the actions of formal natures. For instance, 
if an animal lacks the appropriate materials for the construction of certain parts, 
it will also lack the parts; if it has them, but not in sufficient amounts, it will 
lack some of the parts, as formal natures “cannot (ἀδυνατεῖ) distribute excess 
materials to multiple locations at the same time” (PA IV 10, 655a28-9).26 Even if 
formal natures “want to”, it is often impossible to counteract the material natures 
(see GA IV 10, 778a4-9; PA IV 5, 682a1-8; and Pol I 5, 1254b27-33).
 In short, even though Aristotle makes very little direct reference to the 
“instructions” contained in the definition of the substantial being of the animal, 
a good deal of its structural and functional features turn out to be predetermined 
by it. On the other hand, the actions of formal natures are not exhausted by 
doing what is necessary; they can also do what is possible, better, or best.
3. Decisions up to formal natures: doing what is possible, better, or best
 Aristotle’s depictions of formal natures acting as craftsmen are richest where 
the instructions provided by the definitions of substantial beings appear to be 
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underdetermined. In particular, these instructions turn out to be silent about 
such questions as how many parts a formal nature should produce, where in the 
animal’s body they should be placed, and what they should do with extra materials. 
In reconstructing the causes for why each animal species ends up functioning 
and looking the way it does, Aristotle often invokes teleological principles, 
which posit certain rules of actions formal natures “always” or “never” follow 
when producing the animal in question. I will discuss the two most prominent 
of these teleological principles and specify the underlying decision-procedures 
that Aristotle attributes to formal natures in designing animals.
Rule 1:  Use extra materials for a purpose, when possible and if this improves 
the animal
 We already encountered (in section 2, above) the first teleological principle, 
which assumes that, as a general rule, “nature does everything either because it 
is necessary or because it is better”. I suggested that Aristotle uses the principle 
to identify whether a part is necessary for the performance of a function that is 
specified by the animal’s substantial being, and must therefore be produced by 
the formal nature, or whether it is rather subsidiary and therefore not present 
in all that perform the function in question. The second part of the principle is 
of special interest here, because the contrast of subsidiary parts with those that 
are necessary suggests that the former are optional for formal natures: whereas 
necessary parts are the result of actions natures perform “because it is necessary”, 
subsidiary parts are the result of actions natures perform “because it is better”. 
Aristotle often refers to these latter parts as being “for the better”, indicating—as 
we saw in section 1 above—that these parts are not conditionally necessitated 
by the animal’s form, but are rather due to formal natures making use of extra 
materials that have come to be of material necessity.
 Whether or not formal natures produce such subsidiary parts, depends, first, 
on whether or not such extra materials are available (and if so, whether they have 
the appropriate material potentials such that they can be used for improvements 
of the animal’s design), and second, on whether the feature that can be made 
from those materials is in fact “for the better” for the animal in question. This 
second condition raises an important question: for how do natures “know” 
what extra features will improve the well-being or functionality of an animal? For 
instance, in discussing the use of the “earthen and warm” residues in birds (PA 
IV 12, 694a22-b11), Aristotle says that “in some [nature] constructs length for the 
legs, in others—instead of this—it fills the gaps in their feet.” In both cases, the 
use natures make of identical materials is for the better given each bird’s specific 
way of life, but how do natures determine this? I address this question below, 
after first discussing the second rule of action for formal natures, in which the 
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language of choice and deliberation is even more prominent.
Rule 2: always do what is best, given the possibilities
 The second teleological principle assumes that “nature does nothing in vain, 
but always, given the possibilities, does what is best for the substantial being of 
each kind of animal”.27 In section 1, we saw that Aristotle invokes the first part 
of this principle for the explanation of “paradoxical” absences of parts. Here I 
focus on the second part, which Aristotle invokes to explain the presence of parts 
(or their differentiations) in cases where comparative observation with wider 
or related kinds shows that there are several possibilities in which nature could 
have fulfilled a certain functional need. If we assume, as Aristotle does, that this 
distribution of features in the animal world is not random, we can discover its 
causes by thinking about natures as designer-craftsmen.
 The thought experiment works as follows: think of the options among which 
nature can choose as a fixed range, that is, as consisting of the observed range 
of (the relevantly similar) features realized in actual animals (the hypothetical 
design space is thus not completely open, but limited to natural possibilities).28 
Assuming, then, that natures match each possible part with the animal that is 
most fitted to use that part, we should investigate the animal’s substantial being 
(which, in principle, is fixed and cannot be tinkered with), and see if we can 
identify what aspect of it prompted natures to distribute the parts in the way 
they did. Take Aristotle’s explanation of why human beings have hands instead 
of forelimbs (PA IV 10, 687a6-18):
And being upright in nature, humankind has no use for forelimbs, 
and instead of these, nature provides arms and hands… It is reasonable 
that because of their being most intelligent, they received hands. For hands 
are instruments, and nature always distributes—like an intelligent 
human—each thing to the one who can use it… So if it is better thus, 
and nature does, among the possibilities, what is best (ἡ δὲ φύσις ἐκ 
τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον), it is not because they have 
hands that humans are most intelligent, but because they are the most 
intelligent of animals that they have hands.
All blooded live-bearing and land-dwelling animals have forelimbs, but humans 
have hands, and this distribution cannot simply be explained by reference to the 
(generic) function these parts perform: both are for grasping. Instead, Aristotle 
appeals to the teleological actions of formal natures in “deciding” this distribution: 
given the two options, hands and forelimbs, hands are the best fit for humans, 
and the reason why lies in their substantial being. First, since humans walk 
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upright (this is an essential characteristic: see PA IV 6, 686a25-31), they do not 
need—and therefore do not have—forelimbs for walking. Secondly, and more 
importantly, since humans are the most intelligent of animals, they are best able 
to use hands, and it befits natures to give parts to animals that are best able to 
use them (PA IV 10, 687a12-16).
 Aristotle believes that formal natures follow the same rule of action when 
deciding how many parts to produce for the performance of functions as well as for 
deciding where to place those parts in the animal body.29 In each case, empirical 
observation reveals the range of possibilities (of numbers of parts or of locations 
in the animal body) from which natures are assumed to choose the best option 
for each animal, given its substantial being.
 In the first case, natures always assign or give as many parts to animals as are both 
necessary and sufficient for them to function. If possible, animals have one part 
for the performance of each function (and never more than one), but if necessary, 
nature will use the same part for multiple functions.30 For instance, insects receive 
many wings and separate parts for drawing in nourishment and for defense, unless 
they are too small, in which case they only receive two wings (for this number is 
sufficient for flying) and one piercing tongue (PA IV 6, 683a19-25):
And it is better, where possible, not to have the same instrument for 
dissimilar uses, but the one that is defensive most sharp, and the one 
that is to be a tongue spongy and able to draw in nourishment. For 
where it is possible for two things to be used for two functions without 
impeding each other, nature is unaccustomed to making things as does 
the coppersmith who, to economize (πρὸς εὐτέλειαν), makes a spit-
and-lampstand; but where this is not possible, nature makes use of the 
same thing for multiple functions.
Aristotle’s point is that while it is certainly possible for natures to “cut down” on 
the number of parts assigned to many-winged insects, it is not their custom to 
act frugally. On the other hand, natures also do not assign parts too generously. 
For instance, animals for which it is possible to receive a means of defensive 
only receive one of these, since that is sufficient (PA III 2, 663a17-18);31 and since 
defense is a non-necessary function, formal natures only provide such parts to 
animals that are able to use them—which is mostly to males (PA III 1, 661b28-31).
 In the second case, natures always distribute or place parts in a balanced manner 
in the animal’s body: parts receive the most valuable location possible, as long as 
the balance and symmetry between the two halves of the body (along the up and 
down, left and right, front and back) is preserved and each part has a counterpart 
(cf. PA II 7, 652a30-3 and IV 12, 695a9-13). This rule of balanced distribution 
explains, for instance, why the heart is located where it is (PA III 4, 665b18-21): 
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“Moreover, its position is at an originative place; for it is near the middle, and 
more above than below, and more in front than in the rear; for nature places the 
more valuable item in the more valuable locations (ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τιμιωτέροις τὸ 
τιμιώτερον καθίδρυκεν ἡ φύσις), where nothing greater prevents it.” The heart 
is the most important bodily part, which is why it is placed at the most valuable 
location.32 Functional needs, however, are always given precedence to the value 
of a location: hence, four-footed animals receive more hair on their back, which 
is where the functional need of coverage is highest, whereas humans—whose front 
and back equally require coverage—receive more hair on the front, which is the 
most valuable location (PA II 14, 658a18-24).
 Locations in animal bodies derive their value from their closeness to the 
origin of the three most important functions of living beings (cf. IA 4, 705a31-
2: “this distinction is one of function”):33 the front is where the function of 
sight originates, up is where the function of nourishment originates, and right 
is where locomotion originates.34 These three locations and their counterparts 
make up the six dimensions of the body, dividing it up in two parts along three 
axes. This doubleness of the body, then, explains why many parts—such as the 
sense organs—come in pairs (PA II 10, 656b27-657a12):
As to the position of the sense-organs, all the organs of sense have been 
ordered by nature in a good way… Each of the sense organs is double on 
account of the body being double—one part on the right and one part 
on the left. For because the body is double each of the organs of sense 
is double, one part the right, the other the left…
Note, by the way, that the doubleness of such parts is no exception to the 
“economical” workings of nature: Aristotle believes that these parts are one in 
form, but double in structure, and that this is in fact best, given the doubleness 
of the body itself.35
4. Conclusion: implications for Aristotle’s embryology and teleology
 My reconstruction above of Aristotle’s assumptions about how natures “weigh” 
the available natural possibilities and choose the best design option for each 
individual kind of animal shows that many features are not “preprogrammed” by 
the definition of the substantial beings of animals. The “phenotype” of animals 
develops gradually, as a result of natures not just doing what is necessary, but also 
doing what is better and best in response to emerging problems and opportunities. 
However, this also brings us back to our previous questions: how do natures 
“know” how to determine what is better or best in those cases, and what do these 
images of “crafting natures” mean for Aristotle’s theory of teleology?
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 When evaluating Aristotle’s craft-imagery of natures, it is important to realize 
that their ability to produce functional living beings on the basis of forms or 
“instructions” that are themselves underdetermined does not imply that Aristotle 
believes that these natures deliberate or entertain conscious intentions. In his 
defense of natural teleology, Aristotle argues that “it is absurd to think that 
nothing comes to be for the sake of something unless that which effects the 
change is observed to deliberate; in fact, even art does not deliberate” (Phys II 8, 
199b26-30). In artificial production, the true efficient cause is art, and thus the 
psychological states of the artist only matter in the sense that art cannot exercise 
itself, but operates through the artist. Consequently, there is no need to attribute 
deliberation to natures, the efficient causes of natural generation.
 The imagery does imply, however, that the efficiency of neither art nor nature 
lies in “blindly” following predetermined models or forms. For instance, the art 
of shoemaking does not just comprise producing large sets of limited types of 
identical shoes, but also of making adjustments to a shoe-mold to accommodate 
the wishes of an especially large-footed or fashion-sensitive client in addition to 
making good use of the leftover leather materials. Similarly, the “art” of natures, 
so to speak, comprises a certain level of creativity or problem-solving ability, which 
is not due to some kind of extra deliberating capacity these natures possess, but 
rather to their inherent, immanent goal-directedness. At the physiological level, 
that is, when we translate Aristotle’s talk of goal-directed natures into realizations 
of potentials for form in the manner proposed by Gotthelf (see note 5 above), 
this means that those potentials have to be equally “creative” or “dynamic”. If 
I am right in assuming that Aristotle’s depictions of natures as craftsmen are 
no mere metaphors, but in fact reflect different causal patterns that underlie 
animal generation, the potentials for form that guide embryology and the later 
development of animals cannot be blind, automated self-regulating principles. 
Rather, they are flexible and complex, and include the capacities to make the 
best use of extra materials and to respond to emerging problems or possibilities.
 In sum, although thinking about formal natures as designer-craftsmen 
provides a powerful tool for the discovery of the underlying natural causes in 
animal generation, this does not commit Aristotle to a demiurgic teleology. It 
does, however, entail that we revise our interpretation of the causal roles played 
by the potentials for form in the coming to be of animals: their flexible and 
dynamic nature allows for and in fact demands quite impressive transformations 
of species, if only at the level of embryogenesis.
  The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
45   Mariska Leunissen
19
Leunissen: "Crafting Natures": Aristotle on Animal Design
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2011
“Crafting Natures”: Aristotle on Animal Design   46
Notes
* This is a revision of a paper presented at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 
at a meeting of the St. Louis Area Philosophy of Science Association, and 
at the Center for Philosophic Exchange at the College at Brockport, State 
University of New York. I would like to thank the audiences with whom I 
discussed this paper on those occasions, and especially Devin Henry for his 
extensive written comments on an earlier draft.
1  On this model of reproduction as ‘formal replication’, see Gotthelf (1987); 
Lennox (2001a), 230-232; and Witt (1994b), 222-228. On the sense in which 
Aristotelian species are eternal, see Cooper (1982) and Lennox (2001a), 131-
159.
2  See DA II 4, 415a25-b7; GA II 1, 731b24-732a1; Meta V 28, 1024a29-31 and 
VII 8; and GC II 10-11. On the fixity of species in Aristotle, see, e.g., Cooper 
(1982), 197-222 and Sorabji (1980), 145-6.
3  These natures, however, operate as internal principles; Aristotle does not 
endorse the external, providential kind of teleology as presented in Plato’s 
Timaeus. On this issue, see Lennox (2001a), 182-204 and (2009), 359-60.
4  For the idea that Aristotle’s understanding of natural kinds is not as such 
‘anti-evolutionary’, see already Balme (1972), 97-98; Granger (1987), 110-116; 
Henry (2006), 451-455; and Lennox (2001a), 160-162.
5  My paper thus provides further evidence for Allan Gotthelf’s suggestions 
on how to cash out Aristotle’s use of craft-language in non-intentional, 
physiological terms: see Gotthelf (1987) and Leunissen & Gotthelf (2010), 
342.
6 See Broadie (1990) and Lennox (2001a), 230-232.
7  Sometimes Aristotle depicts the actions of nature itself as those of a painter: 
e.g., nature ‘sketched in’ (ὑπέγραψεν) two blood-vessels running from the 
heart of the embryo (GA II 4, 740a28-9), skeletal analogues in sepia and 
squids (PA II 8, 654a24-6), and hair on human chests (PA II 14, 658a21-3), 
and it ‘decorated’ (ἐπικεκόσμηκεν) long tails with hair (PA II 14, 658a31-
5). Cf. Aristotle’s comparison of blood-vessels to a frame-work (ὡς περὶ 
ὑπογραφὴν) in GA IV 1, 764b30.
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8 Cf. Broadie (1990), 396-398.
9  Cf. Gotthelf (1987), 184n.46 on natures ‘deciding’ how many stomachs and 
sets of teeth to give a certain animal: ‘It would not be amiss to see a vague 
developmental hypothesis in the background.’
10  Some of the examples are discussed more fully in Leunissen (2010); here I 
reexamine them with a focus on Aristotle’s views on animal design.
11  On the scientific status and use of teleological principles, see Lennox 
(2001a), 182-204 and Leunissen (2010), 112-151.
12  This does not mean that according to Aristotle everything in nature must 
be present for a purpose (see PA IV 2 677a15-18), but rather that formal 
natures cannot perform non-purposeful actions, such as placing horns on 
bulls’ shoulders (PA III 2, 663a34-b13); cf. also PA II 8, 653b27-9 and II 9, 
654b23-4.
13  On cases where the actions of formal natures are compromised or restricted 
by the animal’s material nature, see Lennox (2001a), 182-204 and (2001b), 
228; on animals lacking parts due to a ‘deformation of their kind’, which 
goes back to a material distortion during embryogenesis (cf. HA VIII 2, 
589b29-590a11), see Granger (1987), 110-16.
14  For other examples, see PA II 13, 658a6-10; IV 11, 690b14-18; IV 12, 694a16-
18; IV 13, 696a10-15; IA 2, 704b12-18; 4, 705b25-29; Resp. 10, 476a11-15; 
and GA V 1, 781b22-8.
15  Using the format of the Posterior Analytics, the explanation would run as 
follows: premise 1: having (a maximum of) four feet holds of no blooded 
animal whose length is out of proportion to the rest of its body; premise 
2: having the length out of proportion to the rest of their body holds of all 
snakes (which are blooded animals); conclusion: having (a maximum of) 
four feet holds of no snakes.
16  The Greek is (παρα)καταχρῆται; see PA II 16, 659b34-660a2; III 9, 
671a35-b2; IV 10, 688a19-25, 689a5-7, 689b34-690a4; and Resp. 7, 473a23-5.
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nature remedies a problem with the positioning of one part by constructing 
another: because of other necessitating factors, nature has to place the 
windpipe in front of the esophagus, where ‘it is interfered with by the food’ 
(PA III 3, 664b20-1). So, in order to prevent food from slipping down the 
windpipe, nature ‘has constructed the epiglottis’ (664b21-22), to ‘remedy 
(ἰάτρευκεν) the badness of the position of the windpipe’ (665a7-8).
19  I call this causal process of natures making use of materials that have come to 
be of material necessity ‘secondary teleology’, using ‘primary teleology’ for 
the realization of a potential for form through stages shaped by conditional 
necessity (conform Gotthelf’s 1987 interpretation of teleology): see 
Leunissen (2010).
20 Code (1997), 139-140 and Gotthelf (1985), 27-54; (1987), 190-191.
21  PA II 8, 653b19-23 (cf. II 2, 647a20-3); IV 12, 693b2-13; and IV 13, 695b17-25.
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20; GA II 6, 745a5-6; DA II 4, 416a15-18; and Pol V 9, 1309b18-35.
24 PA IV 5, 678a31-5; IV 12, 693b2-13; and IV 13, 695b17-26.
25 Cf. Gotthelf (1987), 192-193.
26  See also PA III 2, 664a1-3 and IV 12, 694a28. Lennox (2001a, 192-3) 
suggests that natures follow a ‘principle of functional priority’ in deciding 
how to use the available materials in these cases.
27 See IA 2, 704b12-18; 8, 708a9-12; and 12, 711a18-29.
28 Lennox (2001), 214-215.
29  Cf. Lennox (2001a), 189 and 203n.16. Natures even follow this rule for 
deciding when to produce parts: see GA II 6, 744a35-b1 and GA V 8, 
788b20-789a2.
30  See PA II 16, 659a20-2; III 1, 661b28-31 and 662a18-24; IV 7, 683b5-7; IV 8, 
684a27-30; IV 10, 687a10-15 and 689a4-15; cf. GA I 1, 716a24-7.
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31  Cf. Aristotle’s remark about the heart that ‘wherever possible, one origin is 
better than many’ (PA III 4, 665b14-15; cf. 665b28-31).
32  See also PA III 3, 665a23-6; III 7, 669b18-26 and 670a4-7; III 10, 672b19-
24; IV 11, 691a28-b4; GA I 8, 718b25-9; I 11, 719a13-15; II 1, 732a3-8; IA 2, 
704b18-22; Cael II 2, 284b10 and 285a11; and III 4, 303b2.
33 See Balme (1987), 277 and Lennox (2001a), 266-272.
34  See PA II 10, 656b22-5; III 3, 665a13-15; IV 7, 683b19-24; IA 4, 705a29-b5 
and 706a21-5; and 5, 706b12-16.
35  Cf. PA III 7, 669b36-670a7. On the doubleness of the body, see Lennox 
(2001a), 267-72 and (2001b), 227.
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